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Abstract 
 Margin squeeze has recently emerged as an important issue in the 
electronic communications markets in the EU, as many incumbent operators 
have exercised this strategy in order to foreclose competitive new entrants. 
The experience in all European cases considered in the literature so far 
shows the difficulty and complexity faced by the competition enforcement 
authorities in implementing the appropriate imputation test for the purpose of 
substantiating an abuse of the dominant position. In the US, some Courts 
have followed a different approach and some authors do not consider margin 
squeeze as a stand-alone form of anti-competitive conduct. Recent Court 
decisions have validated these claims and there is a renewed interest on the 
question of the usefulness of margin squeeze tests in protecting competition 
and consumers.  In the economic literature, there are two imputation tests 
that can be applied to demonstrate an abusive margin squeeze. The first test 
known as the Equally Efficient Operator (EEO) test is based on the costs of 
the incumbent. The second test known as the Reasonably Efficient Operator 
(REO) test is based on the costs of the entrant. The aim of the present paper 
is to analyze these tests and stress their weaknesses as policy tools. In doing 
so we will compare the different approaches on the issue of margin squeeze 
by the EU and the US antitrust authorities. Furthermore, we will offer some 
thoughts on how the margin squeeze problem can be tackled from a dynamic 
point of view.  
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Introduction 
 Margin or price squeeze and its conformity with Article 102TFEU 
has recently emerged as an important issue in the electronic communications 
markets in the EU, as many incumbent operators have exercised this strategy 
in order to foreclose competitive new entrants. The experience in all 
European cases considered in the literature so far shows the difficulty and 
complexity faced by the competition enforcement authorities in 
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implementing the imputation test for the purpose of substantiating an abuse 
of the dominant position. In the US, some Courts have followed a different 
approach and some authors do not consider margin squeeze as a stand-alone 
form of anti-competitive conduct. This approach will be examined later in 
the paper. 
 In the economic literature, there are two imputation tests that can be 
applied to demonstrate an abusive margin squeeze. The first test known as 
the Equally Efficient Operator (EEO) test is based on the costs of the 
incumbent. The second test known as the Reasonably Efficient Operator 
(REO) test is based on the costs of the entrant. 
 The aim of the present paper is to analyze these tests and stress their 
weaknesses as policy tools. In doing so we will compare the different 
approaches on the issue of margin squeeze by the EU and the US antitrust 
authorities. Furthermore, we will offer some thoughts on how the margin 
squeeze problem can be tackled from a dynamic point of view.  
  
What is a margin squeeze? 
 In general, a margin squeeze exists when a dominant vertically 
integrated operator sets its wholesale and/or retail prices at levels that do not 
give a reasonable margin to its downstream competitors (see Crocioni and 
Veljanovski (2003). According to the 
 European Commission “Notice”: “A price squeeze exists if “the 
dominant company’s own downstream operations could not trade profitably 
on the basis of the upstream price charged to its competitors by the upstream 
operating arm of the dominant company”(see European Commission 
(2002b). The crucial factor is the margin between the wholesale and retail 
price and not the absolute value of each one price. 
Below are some definitions of margin squeeze that the European 
Commission has applied in recent cases.  
According to the European Commission Decision (2003b) in the Deutsche 
Telecom case: “a margin squeeze exists if the charges to be paid to DT for 
wholesale access… are so expensive that competitors are forced to charge 
their end users prices higher than the prices DT charges its own end users for 
similar services. If wholesale charges are higher than retail charges, DT’s 
competitors, even if they are at least as efficient as DT, can never make a 
profit…”. Also according to the CFI (2008) in the same case: “If the 
applicant’s retail prices are lower than its wholesale charges, or if the spread 
between the applicant’s wholesale and retail charges is insufficient to enable 
an equally efficient operator to cover its product-specific costs of supplying 
retail access services, a potential competitor who is just as efficient as the 
applicant would not be able to enter the retail access services market without 
suffering losses”. 
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A similar approach has been taken by the Commission in the Telefonica 
case: “… a margin squeeze is an insufficient margin between the price of an 
upstream product A and a price of a downstream product A+B of which A is 
a component…It is this difference and not the specific level of the retail 
and/or wholesale prices which is of importance in margin squeeze cases”(see 
Commission Decision (2007).  
 Here arises the crucial question. What insufficient means? If we 
adopt the definition provided by Carlton (2008) then an entrant will exit the 
downstream market as it will be not be able to compete profitably: “A price 
squeeze occurs when a vertically integrated firm supplies an input to its 
downstream competitors at a price that generates a profit margin so low that 
the competitors exit the downstream market.”  
 However, there remains the issue of timing. Given a margin squeeze, 
will the entrant continue operating with a loss and for how long? Or will the 
entrant exit the market once margin squeeze is applied by the incumbent? 
These questions are important since they are related to the opening of the 
downstream market to competitors and to whether the NCA should intervene 
promptly to allegations of margin squeeze or wait until the market matures as 
we will see below. Furthermore, as Sidak (2008) points out “…attempting to 
implement regulatory policy through section 2 of the Sherman Act is ill-
advised, both because it makes no sense for courts to re-regulate deregulated 
or lightly regulated industries, and because courts lack the institutional 
competence to implement regulation”. On the other hand a crucial question 
arises: what should be the remedy? How the regulator should set the 
“sufficient” margin?  
 
Recent margin squeeze cases in Telecommunications 
 In 2003 Telecom Italia, the incumbent telecom operator, abused its 
dominant position in the market of fixed line telecom services. The practices 
involved a price squeeze in the procurement for the provision of telecom 
services to the Public Administration and the use of restrictive vertical 
contracts with the top business clients. The wholesale interconnection 
services were regulated, while retail prices to the Public Administration were 
unregulated and were determined through a procurement auction. Telecom 
Italia accused for bidding below costs (see Polo (2007).  
 The European Commission found that between September 2001 and 
December 2006, the margin between Telefonica’s retail prices and the prices 
for wholesale broadband access at the regional and national level was 
insufficient to cover the costs of an operator as efficient as Telefonica (see 
European Commission (2007)). Furthermore, according to the European 
Commission, Deutsche Telekom from 1998 to 2001 has infringed Article 82 
EC by operating abusive pricing in the market for direct access to its fixed 
European Scientific Journal November 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition    ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
498 
telephone network in the form of a margin squeeze. DT was charging its 
competitors prices for regulated wholesale access that were higher than its 
prices for retail access to the local network (see European Commission 
(2003) and CFI (2008)). 
 Wanadoo Interactive has been fined for predatory pricing. France 
Telecom's Internet access subsidiary, Wanadoo, had charged predatory 
prices for its consumer broadband internet access services. The company was 
not vertically integrated so the case was one of predation instead of a margin 
squeeze (see Commission Decision (2003a).  
 
Is there an efficient rule for pricing the input? 
 The efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) has been proposed by 
Baumol (Baumol and Sidak, (1994); Willig, (1979)) as the proper way to 
assign access charges to an entrant wishing to join a network which is 
operated by an incumbent monopoly. When the services offered by the 
potential entrant are substitutes to the ones offered by the monopoly, the 
ECPR states that the access price that must be charged by the monopoly 
must be equal to the average incremental cost incurred by the entrant plus the 
opportunity cost or profit foregone with the entry of the competitor. 
 Laffont and Tirole (1994) have analyzed the conditions under which 
the ECPR attains productive efficiency and notice that they are quite 
restrictive. Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996) have also examined the 
optimality properties of the ECPR, and their main conclusion is that since the 
notion of the opportunity cost is vague and very hard to estimate, the simple 
ECPR does not offer any advantage over the complex Ramsey pricing rule. 
The ECPR can be derived under the assumption that the monopoly is willing 
to provide entry to the competitor as long as its profits will remain the same 
(the “indifference principle”). However, the monopoly may not know in 
advance how the entry of the competitor is going to affect its profits, 
especially if the services offered by the entrant are not perfect substitutes to 
the ones offered by the monopoly. Therefore, opportunity costs may not be 
known in advance.  
 The fact is that this rule is only a partial one and has nothing to say in 
an unregulated environment. In the absence of regulation, the incumbent can 
invite entry and keep increasing the price of the wholesale input together 
with the retail price in the downstream market at the expense of consumers. 
 
Margin squeeze in practice 
 It is well known (see ERG (2009) that there are two imputation tests 
that can be applied to test for a margin squeeze. The first test known as the 
Equally Efficient Operator (EEO) test is based on the costs of the incumbent: 
If P - c ≥ di then there is no margin squeeze, where c = wholesale price of 
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essential input, P = downstream retail price of incumbent and di = 
downstream costs of incumbent. The second test known as the Reasonably 
Efficient Operator (REO) test is based on the costs of the entrant: If P - c ≥ de 
then there is no margin squeeze where c = wholesale price of essential input, 
P = downstream retail price of incumbent and de = downstream costs of 
entrant. In almost all recent cases regarding margin squeeze abuse the first 
test has been used. It is known that (see ERG (2009) the second test is used 
in mature markets where the aim of the regulator is to promote competition. 
 However, there are certain limitations to the REO approach: 1) It 
does not provide a clear way of calculating the downstream costs of a 
hypothetical "reasonably efficient" entrant. 2) It may attract a non-efficient 
entrant and may provide proof of margin squeeze when the non-efficient 
entrant has very high costs. 3) It is inconsistent with the first test, which in 
fact has always been used by the European Commission and the Community 
Courts. 4) It does not assist in cases where the incumbent operator is more 
efficient than the entrants or some of the entrants are more efficient than 
others.  5) It is in contrast with the rule of competition law. Margin squeeze 
is based on ex ante assumptions and forecasts rather than on ex post facts.  
 More importantly it contradicts the fundamental assumption of 
economic theory that each firm sets its prices so as to maximize its own 
profits or minimize its own costs. Furthermore, objections to the use of the 
REO test are related to the question whether the market under consideration 
is mature or rather at the stage of commercial and technical experimentation. 
It is suggested that the REO test is used a) in mature markets and b) where 
the aim of the regulator is to promote competition.  Otherwise, it is very 
difficult to know whether the ‘hypothetical’ reasonably efficient competitor 
is as-efficient-as the incumbent, and in any case it is not appropriate to 
induce less efficient entry if there are no structural deficiencies in the market. 
 Limitations also apply to the EEO test. At the core of all the 
criticisms lies a realization that the construing elements of the margin 
squeeze test under competition law depend on a number of ad hoc 
assumptions. The timeframe in estimating the cash flow analysis is important 
since it considerably affects the Net Present Value (NPV) under the price 
squeeze test. The range of timeframe considered in international practice is 
striking ranging from five to ten years. This considerably affects the value of 
the NPV and, therefore, the validity of the margin squeeze test. Another 
important factor is the type of costs and revenues included in the test. When 
a company enters a new market, it normally incurs significant early on-going 
costs, which may be reduced in the future once the company becomes more 
established. These higher early costs include marketing costs, advertising 
costs and early learning costs, as the company acquires greater knowledge of 
customer demands etc. The company’s costs are also likely to fall as it 
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increases output towards an efficient scale. It is therefore, very hard for a 
new entrant to compete the incumbent that fully exploits the benefits of 
economies of scale and scope. 
 In any case, the courts must heavily rely their decisions on ex ante 
calculations based on assumptions that may prove irrelevant or simply false. 
 
The US approach 
 The US approach is different than the EU approach as the margin 
squeeze cannot be recognized as a stand-alone violation of antitrust law. Two 
important cases by Trinko and linkLine suffice to show the differences in the 
two approaches. In Trinko the Supreme Court led to the following 
statements: 1) the existence of a regulation does not create an antitrust duty 
to deal, which was the case of the then incumbent regulated carrier Verizon. 
2) if a firm has no duty to deal with its competitors at wholesale, it has no 
duty to deal under conditions that the rivals find advantageous. The Supreme 
Court in the linkLine case applied the reasoning in Trinko to pricing 
conditions (rather than service assistance) to conclude that if there is no 
antitrust duty to deal at the wholesale level and no predatory pricing at the 
retail level, then a firm is not required to price both upstream and retail 
services in a manner that preserves its rival's profit margin. The Court found 
that in order to establish harm from the margin squeeze accusation, it must 
be shown that the incumbent's retail price was predatory. Sidak and Bork 
intervening as Amici Curiae in linkLine case stressed the regulatory nature 
of the price squeeze issue, “which makes sense only as a rule of price 
regulation in an industry already subject to duties to deal and to control by 
institutionally competent regulators. Attempting to implement regulatory 
policy through Section 2 of the Sherman Act is ill advised, both because it 
makes no sense for courts to re-regulate deregulated industries, and because 
courts lack the institutional competence to implement regulation”. 
 However, the two approaches may be reconciled if we can show that 
margin squeeze and predatory pricing constitute the same abuse. In our 
notation margin squeeze according to the equally efficient operator test 
occurs when P - c < di. Predation would imply that the retail price P is lower 
than the average cost of producing in the downstream market P < c + di. This 
may be the reason that US courts refuse to see the margin squeeze itself as a 
breach to antitrust law. In effect, the EU approach cares about the gap 
between P and c whereas the US does not pay any attention to the gap and 
considers these two variables as independent. The US approach is valid if 
one ignores the opportunity cost in the measurement of costs. Therefore, if 
the ECPR pricing is applied, so that the opportunity cost is covered by the 
entrant, then the US approach on predation is no different than margin 
squeeze. In this case the Chicago School of one monopoly profit is valid. 
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Conclusion 
 In this paper we tried to pinpoint the differences in the treatment of 
margin squeeze as a stand-alone abuse in the EU against the US. In effect, 
the EU approach cares about the gap between P and c whereas the US does 
not pay any attention to the gap and considers these two variables as 
independent. The US approach is valid if one ignores the opportunity cost in 
the measurement of costs. Therefore, if the ECPR pricing is applied, so that 
the opportunity cost is covered by the entrant, then the US approach on 
predation is no different than margin squeeze. In this case the Chicago 
School of one monopoly profit is valid. All profit forgone (the opportunity 
cost) is covered through the increase in the access price, so that the 
incumbent has no incentive to engage in excessive pricing in the downstream 
market. The profit of the incumbent remains the same before and after entry 
of the competitor. The US reasoning is simple: if the regulator supports fair 
access to all players, then the only abuse by the incumbent should be that of 
predation. Note that excessive price is not considered an abuse in the US so 
that a high enough access price would not be considered as an abuse. 
 In other words the difference between the EU and US approach is 
about how they perceive the “public” network of the incumbent. If it is the 
result of public investment over the years, it should be provided at cost and 
predation is the only abuse of dominance.  
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